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Abstract. D arw inian  explanations fo r  teleology are often imprecise, and  
justify  the occurrence o f  teleological features by referring to natural selection 
in a vague and  unspecified sense. In  this paper, the D arwinian account fo r  
teleology is further analyzed. I t  is argued tha t in theory only a specific form  
o f  teleology — teleology that is caused by and directed towards the preserva­
tion o f  the genetic program — can be explained in a naturalistic way by em­
ploying D arwin ’s theory o f  natural selection. This observation links teleology 
with the units o f  selection discussion, as fo r  both discussions the end-direction 
o f  teleological processes and  behavior is o f  elementary importance. According 
to D aw kins’ analysis, the u n it o f  selection is an active germ-like replicator 
with a sufficient degree o f  longevity-fecundity-copying fidelity. From the tele­
ological p o in t o f  view, the u n it o f  selection should additionally incorporate
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the genetic program in order to naturalize teleology. I t  is shown that within  
sexually reproducing species these two requirements cannot be met. D aw kins’ 
concept o f  genic selectionism cannot be m ain ta ined  w ithou t violating the 
naturalistic claims on teleology, and  none o f  the other frequently proposed 
u n it o f  selection candidates can adequately meet the demands as developed 
by Dawkins and  those developed in the light o f  teleology.
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N
In  this paper, the term  teleology refers to the existence o f tele­
ological processes and behavior in living beings. In a naturalistic 
con tex t, these p roperties  call fo r an exp lanation . R ejecting  all 
finalistic, dualistic and vitalistic claims on the occurrence o f tele- 
ological phenom ena, naturalism  is still left w ith the question how 
the world ends up filled with objects that seem to falsify the claim 
th a t every th ing  in the  universe is th e  resu lt o f  the  free play o f 
physical forces to which no goal, purpose or specific direction can 
be a ttribu ted . As M ayr rem arked, “no discussion o f causality is 
complete which does not come to grips with the problem  of teleol­
ogy” (Mayr [1988a], p. 29).
T here is general consensus am ong biologists and philosophers 
on the fact th a t D arw in  solved the  epistem ological conflict be­
tween naturalism  and teleology. N atural selection is the key to the 
mystery, and the rem edy from  all vitalistic, dualistic and finalistic 
claims on the natural world. Contem porary biology maintains that 
natural selection can give a naturalistic account for the existence of 
teleological features of living beings by proposing a causal mecha­
nism  for their origin.
T h e  decisiveness, how ever, w ith  w hich scientists claim  th a t 
D arw in incorporated  teleology in a naturalistic  fram ew ork often 
does no t correspond to the effort taken to elucidate it. As George 
C. W illiams noted, often natural selection does little more than  to 
provide “a vague aura o f validity to conclusions on adaptive evolu­
tion  and to  enable a biologist to  refer to goal-directed  activities 
w ithout descending in to  teleology” 1 (W illiams [1966], p. 20). In
1 T h a t is, any n o n -na tu ra listic  account for them . In literatu re, teleology is often 
autom atically associated w ith non-naturalistic notions.
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this paper I will analyze the received D arw inian explanation for 
teleology by examining Ernst M ayr’s account, which is a good rep­
resentation of the general view among Darwinists. It is shown that 
M ayr’s explanation remains imprecise in the sense that he explains 
teleological features by simply referring to ‘fitness’, despite the fact 
th a t th is is an am biguous term  th a t can have various m eanings 
(Dawkins [1982]).
Based on these observations and objections, I will w ork ou t a 
m ore precise description of those teleological processes and behavior 
tha t are explainable and understandable in a naturalistic context. 
T h is descrip tion can be seen as all those necessary requirem ents 
th a t entities th a t exhibit teleology should m eet in order to make 
these features explainable. T he  next step will be to  investigate 
w hether living beings actually meet these requirements, i.e. w hether 
the teleology found in nature can be explained. This will be done 
based on the units o f selection discussion, which will be shown to 
be m ore closely related to teleology than  assumed up till now.
2 . T E L E O L O G Y  A N D  D A R W IN IS M
O ne of the philosophers who dealt w ith teleology extensively is 
Ernst Mayr. Fundam ental in M ayr’s explanation is the distinction 
between proxim ate and ultim ate causes, both  crucial in the causal 
understand ing  o f teleology. Proxim ate causes are the dom ain of 
functional biology, explaining the processes o f living beings in a 
physicochemical way. There is a causal chain leading from  the in­
fo rm ation  stored in the  genetic code to  the construction  o f the 
organism , w hose executive structu res lead to  the  goal-d irected  
processes and  b ehav io r o f  liv ing  beings. M ayr used the  te rm  
‘te leonom y’ to  refer to  teleology th a t is in line w ith  the  above­
sketched explanation. Those processes are called teleonom ic — and 
thus causally explainable — that owe their teleological characteris­
tics to the operation o f a program  (M ayr [1988a]). In  living be­
ings, this program  is the genetic code, the genotype, which consti­
tutes a tem plate for the developm ent o f the organism.
Still, teleonom y explains teleology only partly. T he in troduc­
tion  o f the genetic program  as the cause o f teleological behavior
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adds an elem ent tha t needs to be explained, nam ely the existence 
o f the  genetic program  itself. In  M ayr’s term inology, th is is the 
dom ain o f the ultim ate causes for teleology, dealing w ith the his­
to ry  o f program s and  th e  laws th a t  con tro l th e ir  changes. T he  
theory o f evolution by natural selection is in troduced as a mecha­
nism that explains the evolution, and through this the existence of 
program s tha t lead to teleonom ic processes and behavior.
W hile dealing at length w ith the proxim ate causes o f teleology, 
M ay r’s exp lana tion  in  re la tion  to  the  u ltim a te  causes rem ains 
rather vague. In  precisely w hat sense the evolutionary theory  ex­
plains the  existence o f these program s rem ains to  a great extent 
unelaborated. In his paper “Cause and Effect in Biology” he states:
N atu ra l selection does its best to favor the  p ro d u c tio n  o f  codes 
guaranteeing behavior that increases fitness (Mayr [1988a], p. 30).
In  “T he M ultiple M eanings o f Teleological”, M ayr argues that 
“all te leonom ic behavior [...]  depends on the existence o f some 
end point, goal or term inus which is foreseen in the program  that 
regulates the behavior”, this end-point being for example “a struc­
ture, a physiological function, the attainm ent o f a new geographi­
cal p o s itio n  or a c o n su m m ato ry  [ ...]  act in  b e h a v io r” (M ayr 
[1988b], p. 45). T hen  he continues:
Each particu la r p rogram  is the  result o f  n a tu ra l selection , co n ­
stan tly  adjusted by the selective value o f the achieved end p o in t 
(M ayr [1988b], p. 45).
W hen M ayr is arguing that natural selection favors the produc­
tion  o f codes, he does not suggest th a t selection itself is the crea­
tive force per se behind their production. In  his paper “Basic C on­
cepts o f Evolutionary Biology” he claims th a t D arw in’s theory  is 
in a way dualistic, in the sense tha t it provides a two-factor expla­
nation. T he first factor is genetic variability, which is “entirely a 
m atter o f chance, whether it is produced by m utation, recom bina­
tion, or by whatever other m echanism ” (Mayr [1976], p. 9). These 
m echanism s, then , p roduce the  en tities exh ib iting  varia tion  on 
which natural selection can work. T he second factor is the process 
o f selection. T he selective value of the genetic code, explaining its
Teleology and  its Consequences 109
preservation, is the fitness that results from  the achieved end-point 
tha t is foreseen in the genetic code.
T he aspect o f the explanation of the ultim ate causes for teleol­
ogy tha t remains vague and insufficient is an exact account o f the 
achieved end-points that give a selective advantage. W hen M ayr is 
giving examples o f teleonomic features, he refers to the fitness that 
these features produce in a vernacular, general sense:
A behavior program  that guarantees instantaneous correct reaction 
to a potential food source, to a potential enemy, or to a potential 
mate will certainly give greater fitness in the Darw inian sense than 
a program  that lacks these properties (M ayr [1988a], pp. 30, 31).
‘F itness’, however, is a vague and confusing w ord. D aw kins 
alone sum m ed up 5 different meanings tha t have been assigned to 
the term  (Dawkins [1982]). W hat is, among others, left open with 
M ayr’s explanation is exactly whose fitness the genetic program s 
should affect in order to explain their existence: fitness could for 
example relate to the fitness o f the specific trait, the fitness of the 
individual, or the fitness of a gene, something which is no t further 
elaborated . W h a t is especially m issing in  M ayr’s descrip tion  of 
achieved end-po in ts is a reference to  the  genetic program  itself, 
despite the elem entary role it plays in his explanation o f teleology.
This shortcoming, i.e. the lack o f an account what end-states of 
teleological features make these features them selves explainable, 
can also be found in the w ork of o ther influential authors. David 
H ull, for example, states tha t the evolutionary theory determ ines 
the ultim ate goal-states o f teleological systems by restricting their 
possible end-states (H ull [1974]). From  a physiological po in t of 
view, m any possible teleological systems can exist, b u t evolution­
ary biology can account for the existence of a certain class of these 
systems in nature. However, H ull does no t follow his argum enta­
tion  by precisely defining w hat these possible end-states are, i.e. 
which possible teleological systems evolutionary  biology can ac­
count for, and which not.
In  light o f these objections, in the next paragraph I will give a 
m ore com prehensive account for the  occurrence o f teleological 
processes and behavior in na tu ra l phenom ena, sta ting  precisely 
which types of teleological processes and behavior can be explained
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w ith in  a naturalistic context, w ithou t the use o f controversial or 
am biguous term s such as fitness.
3. A N  E X A C T  D E S C R IP T IO N : T E L E O L O G Y , T H E  T H E O R Y  
O F  N A T U R A L  S E L E C T IO N  A N D  T H E  U N IT S  O F  S E L E C T IO N
A fundam ental pillar o f the naturalistic m ethod is that no goal, 
purpose or specific d irec tion  can be a ttr ib u ted  to  the  forces of 
nature. W e cannot assume th a t in themselves physical forces have 
any tendency towards teleological behavior, or towards the crea­
tion  o f entities th a t exhibit this behavior. It is only to  structures 
and entities that have been m olded under the mechanism of natu­
ral selection — adaptations — that this goal-direction can be attrib ­
uted. From  these assum ptions, the following can be deduced:
T he name of the game in natural selection is survival. N atural 
selection deals w ith  the differential survival o f the  fit and those 
th a t do no t have w hat it takes to  survive. Therefore, adaptations 
have been developed and retained by virtue o f their con tribu tion  
to the preservation of the surviving entity  — let us call it X. Thus, 
as a rule we can say that all teleological processes and behavior are, 
as their raison d ’être, directed to the preservation o f X, which will 
be defined as the end-direction, or ultim ate goal (Ayala [1970]) of 
these processes and behavior.
T eleological processes and behavior have th e ir  orig in  in  the 
genetic program . Since naturalism  implies tha t we cannot assume 
natural forces being directed to anything, let alone to the creation 
o f genetic programs, this genetic program  has to be included in X 
in order to be actively preserved. If  the genetic program  was not 
included in X, there would be no force directed to its preservation, 
so tha t its perishing w ould be inevitable. H ence, the only genetic 
program s th a t survive (i.e. are fit) are those th a t are d irected  to 
their own preservation, and genetic programs can only survive due 
to the teleological processes and behavior that originates from  that 
same genetic program .
M oreover, since the only processes th a t we can assum e to be 
goal-directed are processes directed at preservation, creation has to 
be b lind  and purposeless. T hus, only und irected  physical forces
can account for the  creation o f  genetic program s, a lthough they 
can be teleologically preserved.
Consequently, naturalism  and D arw in’s theory o f natural selec­
tion  a priori im ply th a t teleology th a t can be accounted for in a 
naturalistic way is o f the following nature: (1) the genetic program 
explains the  occurrence o f teleological processes and  behavior 
(teleonom y), (2) the teleological processes and behavior in their 
tu rn  explain the  preservation o f the  genetic program  as they are 
directed towards the preservation o f X which incorporates the ge­
netic program , although (3) genetic program s are u ltim ately cre­
ated  and  altered  (genetic varia tion) by the  und irec ted  physical 
forces o f nature, such as by m utations and recom bination.
From  the origin of D arw in’s theory o f natural selection, scien­
tific opinions about the level on which selection works — what X is
— have varied from  the individual to  the species, and all the way 
down to the gene. Darwin him self adhered to the idea of the indi­
vidual as the unit for which adaptations exist (Brandon [1984]). In 
the m iddle o f the 20th century, the pendulum  swung to groups or 
species, w ith biologists like W ynne-Edw ards claiming tha t groups 
or species are the  target o f selection. In  the  1960’s and 1970’s, 
W illiams and Dawkins developed theoretical objections against the 
no tions o f bo th  individual and group selection. T he ir approach 
towards the problem  was unique in tha t they started w ith a theo­
retical, conceptional analysis o f the subject before considering po­
tential candidates. T he character of this approach prom pted  H ull 
to call it an act o f metaphysics, in the sense tha t “(Dawkins) pro­
vides a general analysis o f replicators and leaves it a separate issue 
the question which entities in the empirical world happen to have 
the requisite characteristics” (H ull [1984], p. 150). Based on this 
approach, Dawkins claims tha t the un it o f selection, independent 
o f the level on which it will be actually found, is forem ost an “ac­
tive germ -like replicator w ith a sufficient degree o f longevity-fe­
cundity-copying  fide lity” (D aw kins [1982]). D aw kins’ analysis 
also includes the concept of vehicle, which he defines as “any rela­
tively discrete entity, such as an individual organism, which houses 
replicators, and which can be regarded as a m achine program m ed 
to  preserve and  p ro p ag a te  the  rep lica to rs  th a t  ride  in side  i t ”
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(Dawkins [1982], p. 302). T he vehicle is an integrated and coher­
en t instrum ent for replicator preservation, no t th a t which is pre­
served, b u t th a t w hich preserves. M oreover, the  vehicle is n o t a 
continuous, ‘surviving’ entity  like the replicator, bu t a tem porary, 
transient unit.
T he units o f selection discussion is closely related to the natu ­
ralistic explanation of teleology. By definition, the unit o f selection 
is th a t level or un it w ith in  the hierarchy o f life adaptations exist 
for the good of, that is, the level tha t is actively preserved through 
adaptations. Since it was concluded that this end-direction o f tele- 
ological processes and features is crucial in the naturalistic account 
of teleology as well (the genetic program should be included in the 
level that is actively preserved in order to naturalize teleology), the 
u n it o f selection discussion can no t be seen independen t o f the 
discussion about teleology. After all, evolution is no t the only as­
pect o f living beings th a t needs to  be explained: an account for 
their teleological features should be provided as well. I will there­
fore expand the ‘m etaphysics’ o f D aw kins by processing all th a t 
has been said about teleology in his description o f a suitable un it 
o f selection candidate.
T hus to  D aw kins’ dem ands concern ing  the  u n it o f selection 
should be added the demands derived from  the naturalistic expla­
nation  o f teleology in nature. Besides being an active, germ -like 
replicator w ith a sufficient degree o f longevity-fecundity-copying 
fidelity , the  rep licato r should  also include the  genetic program  
underly ing  and defin ing  all teleological processes and behavior 
(teleonom y), these processes and behavior being directed towards 
the preservation o f the un it o f selection — or replicator — itself. If 
the preservation o f the genetic program  that underlies and defines 
all teleological processes and behavior (teleonom y) executed by 
vehicle (or organism) A in generation T  was no t included in the 
direction o f all teleological processes and behavior as executed by 
vehicle A-1 in generation T -1 , i.e. no t included in the un it o f se­
lection X, then  we w ould have to  assume e ither (1) o ther forces 
outside those m olded under the mechanism of natural selection or 
(2) forces n o t belonging to  en tity  X, having created the genetic 
program . However, based on the premises o f naturalism  and the
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th eo ry  o f na tu ra l selection, we m ay n o t assum e these forces or 
m echanism s to  be present. W ith  the same argum ent, we have to 
assum e th a t all teleological processes and  behavior operative in 
vehicle A in generation T  are directed towards preservation o f the 
un it of selection X which includes the genetic program  that forms 
the basis o f all teleological processes and behavior as executed by 
vehicle A+1 in generation T+1. Using D aw kins’ abbreviation o f 
the unit of selection as the “active, germ-like replicator w ith a suf­
ficient degree o f longevity-fecundity-copying fidelity” (Dawkins 
[1982]), we should extend this definition as follows: T he un it of 
selection is th a t level w ith in  the  organization  th a t is an active, 
germ-like replicator with a sufficient degree of longevity-fecundity- 
copying fidelity and which includes the genetic program that forms 
the basis o f  the teleological processes and behavior as executed by the 
vehicle. O r, in  short, a rep licato r th a t encom passes the  genetic 
program .
The aspect of the selective theory that is o f relevance fo r  teleology
— and which M ayr fails to point out — is that natural selection first 
and forem ost produces, and evolution above all deals w ith p ro ­
grams whose teleological processes are directed towards the preser­
vation o f the genetic program  itself (‘self-preservation’). In  a tele­
ological context, fitness p rim arily  relates to  the  capacity to self­
preserve. T he units o f  selection discussion deals w ith a separate as­
pect o f the theory o f natural selection, nam ely the possibilities of 
organisms to evolve through the accum ulation o f beneficial m uta­
tions and to branch out into different species.2 However, the tele- 
ological features o f living beings dem and that this evolution first 
and forem ost takes place betw een organism s whose genetic p ro ­
grams are essentially directed to their own preservation.
Dawkins followed his theoretical analysis by an empirical inves­
tigation. After determ ining the characteristics o f the un it o f selec­
tion, the eye is tu rned  to the empirical w orld to determ ine which
2 N ote that for example replication, which is an elem entary concept in the units of 
selection discussion in the explanation of evolution, plays no role in the teleology discus­
sion. Genetic program s do no t have to replicate in order to be teleological, bu t replica­
tion  is a prerequisite for evolution.
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levels or units correspond to the theoretical characteristics o f the 
u n it o f selection. Following D aw kins’ analysis, in asexual repro­
duction the entire genome could be the un it of selection. In those 
cases in w hich no crossover occurs, en tire  chrom osom es m ight 
serve as units o f selection, and adaptations could be seen as being 
for the good o f the preservation o f the chromosome. However, in 
sexually reproducing organisms the gene is the only candidate that 
can serve as a un it o f selection. It is neither the organism, nor any 
other candidate except the small genetic fragm ent tha t qualifies as 
a replicator, and through this, as the un it o f selection:
Genes are replicators; organisms and groups o f organisms are best 
no t regarded as replicators; they are vehicles in w hich replicators 
travel about (Dawkins [1982], p. 82).
Besides being a replicator w ith a sufficient degree o f longevity- 
fecundity-copying fidelity, from  the teleological po in t o f view the 
level on which selection works should also be that level which in­
corporates the (genetic) program  that gives rise to the teleological 
behav ior (te leonom y). M y next step is therefo re  to  de te rm ine  
w hether, in case o f sexually reproducing organisms, preserving the 
gene also encom passes or guarantees the preservation o f the  ge­
netic program .
4 . G E N E S , G E N O T Y P E  A N D  T E L E O N O M Y
T he task in this section is to  determ ine the exact relationship 
between genes, genotype and the genetic program  in a teleological 
context. It is clear th a t genes do in fact constitu te  the  in form a­
tional backbone o f teleological processes: there is a causal chain 
leading from  the  in fo rm ation  stored  in  the  genetic  code to  the 
construction o f the vehicle, whose executive structures lead to the 
goal-directed processes and behavior o f living beings. M oreover, 
genes are discrete units w ithin the genetic program: genes store the 
inform ation o f the basic units w ithin proteins. It is also clear that 
besides the genetic inform ation there is no o ther source o f infor­
m ation defining the vehicle. All the genetic inform ation is present 
in the gene-pool, consisting o f the com plete genetic inform ation
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of a specific population. W hat is crucial in the relation to teleol­
ogy, however, is that teleological behavior arises only in the specific 
combination and  arrangement o f genes w ith in  an organism. If we 
were able to  random ly  com bine and arrange genes from  a gene 
pool on chromosomes, and random ly com bine chromosomes in a 
cell, we w ould  ob tain  chaos, and certain ly  n o t an astonishingly  
complex, perfectly operating organism. Therefore, it is no t only in 
the  genes per se, b u t in the  h ighly  specific com bination  and ar­
rangem ent o f genes th a t we ob tain  vehicles w ith  these am azing 
teleological processes and behavior, and it is only in this context 
where genes have a teleological m eaning. D aw kins realized this, 
although this fact did not convince him  that the concept o f genic 
selectionism needs to be abandoned. Genes get their m eaning and 
significance only w ith in  the  genetic background  in  w hich they 
operate.
D aw kins proposed two selective m odels to explain how  these 
harm onious combinations of genes come about. The first concerns 
selection on the level o f these higher-order units, where harmonious 
units are favored in natural selection against disharm onious units. 
T he second model refers to selection at the lower levels, which he 
called frequency-dependent selection:
C om ponents w ithin a population are favoured by selection if they 
happen to interact harm oniously w ith the o ther com ponents that 
happen to be frequent in the population. In a population dom inated 
by millers, individual farmers prosper, while in a population  dom i­
nated by farmers it pays to be a m iller (Dawkins [1982], p. 240).
T he same principle holds for genes:
T he genotype may be a ‘physiological team ’, bu t we do no t have 
to believe that that team  was necessarily selected as a harm onious 
unit in comparison w ith less harm onious rivals units. Rather, each 
gene was selected because it prospered in its environm ent, and its 
env ironm ent necessarily included the o ther genes w hich were si­
m ultaneously  prospering  in the gene-pool. G enes w ith  com pli­
m entary ‘skills’ prosper in each others’ presence (Dawkins [1982], 
p. 240).
Dawkins tried to show how individual genes can be the un it of 
selection despite the fact th a t their function ing  relies heavily on
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their cooperation w ith, and the workings of, o ther genes. H e de­
scribed the ‘o ther’ genes as the environm ent in which individual 
genes are selected based on their value as a m em ber o f the team . 
But the other genes that form the environm ent in which individual 
genes operate, is no t so m uch the gene pool, bu t the genes specifi­
cally arranged and com bined  w ith in  the vehicle, the  individual 
organism. A nd this com bination and arrangem ent is no t a steady, 
constant environm ent in the background of which natural selec­
tion can do its work, rather this environm ent is created, with every 
generation, through the elaborate and ingenious teleological proc­
esses and behavior o f living beings under the m echanism  of natu ­
ral selection itself. So while Dawkins em ployed the genetic envi­
ronm ent to establish his genic selection standpoint, it is exactly the 
genetic  en v iro n m en t, g iving rise to  teleo logical processes and 
behavior, which needs to be explained through natural selection.
I have earlier shown th a t natural selection is the only m echa­
nism  u nder w hich we can assum e teleology to appear, and th a t 
preservation is the only direction that can be ascribed to teleologi­
cal processes and behavior. T h is  m eans th a t (1) the  specific ar­
rangem ent and com bination  o f genes w ith in  a genotype cannot 
directly  be shaped  by forces o u ts id e  those  m o ld ed  u n d e r th e  
mechanism of natural selection, and (2) can, through these forces, 
only mean the preservation of a certain com bination and arrange­
m ent of genes that have been m olded by a long process of creation 
(e.g. m utation) and selection. W ith  the gene as the un it o f selec­
tion, teleology would be exclusively directed to the preservation of 
the gene. Still, we see th a t in every generation a new and unique 
genotype, consisting of thousands o f genes ordered in a specific ar­
rangement, is created through teleological processes and behavior 
in the form  of sexual reproduction. A nd this creation can thus not 
be accounted for: w ith the gene as the un it o f selection, all tele- 
ological processes and behavior are exclusively directed to the pres­
ervation of the gene, and cannot account for the creation o f some­
thing that is of a higher level than the gene itself. This leads to the 
conclusion that from  the poin t of view o f teleology, the gene can­
no t be the un it o f selection.
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If  we look at the o ther levels w ith in  the  h ierarchy o f life tha t 
were labeled as possible units o f selection, we also find  the diffi­
culty to com bine the requirem ents from  Dawkins w ith those laid 
dow n in th is paper. T he  fact th a t genes do n o t w ork independ­
ently o f each other, bu t are part of a larger, integrated interacting 
system, could lead to the suggestion tha t the organism is the unit 
o f selection. But, as Dawkins rightly claimed, the organism — and 
the same holds for groups — is n o t a stable un it, som ething tha t 
survives th ro u g h o u t the generations, let alone th a t it is actively 
preserved. Therefore, it falls ou t as candidate for being the unit of 
selection:
Genetically speaking, individuals and groups are like clouds in the 
sky or dust — storms in the desert. They are tem porary aggregations 
or federa tions. T hey  are n o t stable th ro u g h  evo lu tionary  tim e 
(Dawkins [1976], p. 36).
W hat about species? T he first objection to  group selection on 
the level o f the species I share w ith Dawkins. Species, indeed, are 
hard to conceive as replicators. A nd w ithout being a replicator, it 
is hard  to  im agine how this un it could have evolved through  the 
accum ulation of beneficial m utations. A nother reason for rejecting 
the species as a un it o f selection is derived from  the po in t of view 
o f teleology. T he gene pool is, like the individual gene, no t iden­
tical with the genetic program. It is only through the specific com­
binations and arrangem ent o f a selection o f genes from  the gene 
pool w ithin the organism th a t teleological processes and behavior 
arise. So we m ight say tha t species are preserved through the tele- 
ological activ ities w ith in  organism s (in co n tra ry  to  organism s 
which are not preserved, bu t created), the species, or gene pool, is 
no t identical w ith the genetic program .
T he attem pt to reconcile the demands created by Dawkins and 
those constructed in light o f teleology in various levels w ithin the 
biological organization is sum m arized in table 1.
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Does i t  replicate? Is it  preserved? Does it  encompass the genetic program?
G ene Yes Yes N o
Individual N o N o Yes
G roups N o N o N o
Species N o Yes N o
T ab le  1 — C an d id a tes for th e  u n it  o f  se lection  in sexually rep ro d u c in g  species, to ­
gether w ith  a sum m ary  o f  th e  m ost im p o rtan t requirem ents, derived from  D aw kins’ 
analysis o f  th e  replicator and  th e  naturalistic  account for teleology. All requirem ents 
have to  be m et in o rd e r to  m ake th e  can d id a te  a su itab le  u n it  o f  se lec tion .
5. A L T E R N A T IV E  V IE W : JA C Q U E S  M O N O D
Earlier in this paper I claimed tha t m any biologists dealt w ith 
teleo logy  in  a vague and  incom ple te  way. A n excep tion  is the  
F rench  b io log ist Jacques M o n o d , w ho dealt w ith  the  to p ic  at 
len g th  in  his w ork  ‘C hance  and  N ecessity ’. T h e  em phasis he 
placed on this subject is reflected by his claim that the teleonom ic 
properties o f living beings challenge one of the basic postulates of 
m odern science:
O bjectivity  [...]  obliges us to recognize the teleonom ic character 
o f living organisms, to adm it that in their structure and perform ­
ance they act p rojectively  — realize and pursue a purpose. H ere 
therefore, at least in appearance, lies a p ro found  epistem ological 
contradiction. In fact the central problem  of biology lies w ith this 
very contradiction, which, if it is only apparent, m ust be resolved; 
or else proven to be u tterly  insoluble, if that should tu rn  ou t in ­
deed to be the case (M onod [1972], pp. 21-22).
M onod  argued th a t the central no tion  w ith in  the solution to 
the problem  o f teleology is the relation between teleonomy and in ­
variant reproduction. Invariant reproduction is the ability o f living 
beings to  reproduce and to  tran sm it ne varietur  (unaltered) the 
inform ation  corresponding to their own structure. T he inform a­
tion  that stands at the basis of all teleological processes and behavior 
by serving as a blueprint for the organizational scheme of the indi­
vidual, is preserved in tact from  one generation to the next one:
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All the functional adaptations in living beings, like all the artifacts 
they produce, fulfill particu lar projects w hich may be seen as so 
m any aspects or fragm ents o f a unique prim ary project, w hich is 
the preservation and m ultip lication  o f the species.
T o  be m ore precise, we shall arbitrarily  choose to define the es­
sential teleonom ic project as consisting in the transm ission from  
generation  to generation  o f the invariance con ten t characteristic 
o f the species. All the structures, all the perform ances, all the ac­
tivities c o n tr ib u tin g  to  the  success o f  the essential p ro jec t w ill 
hence be called ‘teleonom ic’ (M onod [1972], p. 14).
W hat M onod  described here is essentially the same as w hat I 
concluded earlier as the necessary requirem ents o f living beings to 
explain teleology in a naturalistic way. T he teleological processes 
and behavior are directed to the preservation o f the genetic p ro ­
gram (what M onod describes as the invariance content o f the spe­
cies), this genetic program  itself being the cause for teleological 
processes. T he aspect o f M onod’s argum ent th a t differs from  the 
conclusions o f this paper is, however, n o t o f theoretical nature, 
b u t o f em pirical. Living beings do n o t behave the  way M onod  
described. For h im , species are like g ian t replicators, being the 
unit that is m ultiplied and preserved through the teleonomic proc­
esses and behavior, and whose con ten t is transm itted  ne varietur 
from  g en era tio n  to  gen era tio n . H ow ever, the  species is n o t a 
replicator, the gene is. Also, it is no t the species’ invariant content 
tha t is transm itted  from  generation to generation, b u t a selection 
o f the gene pool of the species w ithin individuals. M oreover, only 
the genetic conten t within individuals gives rise to  teleology, not 
the genetic conten t o f the species as a whole.
If living beings did behave the way M onod described, i.e. if liv­
ing beings had  a fixed genetic  p rogram  th a t was preserved and 
m ultiplied ne varietur from  generation to generation, then  indeed 
we had found the solution to the ‘problem  of teleology’. However, 
M onod  m ixed up and  com bined  the  invarian t character o f the 
species, w ith  the  m ultip lying  character o f genes and teleological 
character o f individuals. But the fact is th a t — at least in sexually 
reproducing species — it is no t possible to com bine these three el­
ements.
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6 . C O N C L U S IO N
Based on the incompleteness o f earlier D arw inian accounts for 
the  existence o f teleological processes and behavior, I have con­
structed  general requirem ents th a t should  be m et to make these 
features comprehensible in a naturalistic way. An im portant role is 
played by the end-direction of teleological processes and behavior, 
as the genetic program  that gives rise to teleology should be incor­
porated  w ith in  this end-direction. T his same level is essential for 
the  units o f selection discussion, w hich is n o t dealing explicitly 
w ith  teleology, b u t w ith  the  possib ility  o f organism s to  evolve 
through the accum ulation o f beneficial m utations. U ntil this day, 
this discussion has been going on w ith in  its own, biological con­
text. However, I have indicated that teleology, and the attem pt to 
explain this phenom enon in a naturalistic way, creates additional 
dem ands for this un it, and thus transcends its relevance from  an 
exclusive biological to a philosophical level.3 T he un it o f selection 
cannot just be a replicator w ith a sufficient degree of longevity-fe­
cundity-copying fidelity; it should additionally incorporate the ge­
n e tic  p ro g ram  th a t  gives rise to  teleo logy . I have show n th a t  
w ith in  the biological hierarchy o f life, it is no t possible to  find  a 
level th a t satisfies bo th  the dem ands created in light o f teleology 
and those in light o f the units o f selection discussion. T he gene, 
which is the only suitable candidate based on the un it of selection 
discussion, cannot be m aintained w ithou t violating the dem ands 
created in order to arrive at a naturalistic  account for teleology, 
and none of the other frequently proposed unit of selection candi­
dates can come to grips with the demands as developed by Dawkins 
and  those developed in  the  ligh t o f teleology. T h is  m eans th a t 
D arw in’s theory of natural selection cannot account for both  evo­
lu tio n  and  teleology w ith in  a n a tu ra lis tic  fram ew ork, or to  be 
more precise, that the theory of evolution by natural selection can­
no t be m aintained w ithou t presupposing a teleology th a t cannot
3 This contrary to D ennet’s remark, that however the outcom e o f the units o f selec­
tion  discussion, D arw inism  will still be standing strong (D ennet [1995]). T he un it of 
selection controversy is no t only relevant to biology alone, but its relevance stretches out 
to the Darwinian and naturalistic m ethod in general.
be accounted for in a naturalistic way.
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U N  C A S O  R IA P E R T O : LA T E L E O L O G IA  E  IL  S U O  R U O L O  
N E L L A  D IS C U S S IO N E  S U L L E  U N IT À  D I  S E L E Z IO N E
Riassunto
Il darw inism o cerca di spiegare l ’esistenza della teleologia in natura  
facendo riferim ento in m odo vago alla selezione naturale. In questo arti- 
colo si precisa che la teoria darw iniana della selezione naturale puo spie­
gare solo una specifica form a di teleologia, ossia quella causata da e di-
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re tta  verso la preservazione del program m a genetico. Il p roblem a della 
teleologia viene affrontato in relazione alla discussione sulle un ità  di se­
lezione. Secondo l ’analisi di Dawkins l’unità  di selezione è un replicatore 
dotato di un sufficiente grado di longevità-fecondità-fedeltà di copiatura. 
Per naturalizzare la teleologia occorrerebbe che l’un ità  di selezione com- 
prendesse anche il program m a genetico. Viene m ostrato che nessuno dei 
candidati generalm ente proposti quali un ità  di selezione puo soddisfare 
contem poraneam ente i requisiti indicati da Dawkins e quelli richiesti da 
una spiegazione naturalistica della teleologia.
